Pretoria’s Broken Promise: Why Tigray’s Peace Failed Its People
The Pretoria Agreement failed to deliver lasting peace because its promises lacked strong enforcement, displaced Tigrayans remained unable to return home, and justice remained incomplete. Tigrayan leaders deserve scrutiny for accepting inadequate safeguards and allowing political divisions to undermine recovery. The African Union must answer for ineffective monitoring, while Western partners should explain why diplomatic and economic cooperation advanced without sufficient accountability. Allegations of deliberate betrayal or favoritism remain unproven; the clearest failure is the continued suffering of civilians.
_Opinion | October 5, 2026_
The Pretoria Agreement promised to end a devastating war and establish the foundations of lasting peace. Signed on November 2, 2022, it committed the Ethiopian government and the Tigray People’s Liberation Front to stop hostilities, protect civilians, facilitate humanitarian assistance, and pursue political dialogue and accountability. Its promise extended beyond silencing weapons: it was supposed to make survival, recovery, and security possible.
For displaced Tigrayans still unable to return home, that promise remains painfully incomplete. An agreement cannot be judged solely by diplomatic ceremonies or declarations of success. Its real test is whether families regain their homes, survivors receive justice, and children can grow up without hunger or renewed bombardment.
A ceasefire without sufficient guarantees
Pretoria contained a fundamental vulnerability. It required TPLF disarmament and the restoration of federal authority while depending heavily on cooperation between the parties to deliver protection and resolve political disputes. Its monitoring system could identify violations and convene a joint committee, but it did not establish an independent enforcement force. Contested areas were left for constitutional resolution, while transitional justice was assigned to a national process led by the Ethiopian government.
These arrangements demanded extraordinary trust after extraordinary violence. In my assessment, the agreement’s weakness was the gap between concrete security concessions and protections that depended on future political cooperation. A ceasefire can create an opportunity for peace; it cannot substitute for enforceable guarantees.
Refugees International warned in December 2025 that incomplete federal implementation, the absence of justice, and divisions within Tigray’s leadership were threatening the settlement. Its analysis described factions aligning with Addis Ababa and Eritrea respectively—a dangerous fragmentation of political authority rather than a shared program for civilian recovery.
Tigrayan leaders must answer their people
The accusation that Tigray’s leaders “surrendered to the enemy” expresses profound anger. However, negotiating an end to mass suffering is not, by itself, evidence of betrayal. The stronger criticism concerns what leaders secured, what they conceded, and how they held themselves accountable afterward.
Did they obtain adequate protection for displaced communities? Did they explain the agreement’s risks honestly? Did they establish clear conditions for implementation and communicate violations openly? Did political competition take precedence over the needs of survivors?
These questions deserve public answers. Leaders who negotiated in the name of Tigray must accept scrutiny from the people whose future they negotiated. Neither wartime sacrifice nor political seniority grants permanent immunity from accountability.
The leadership split documented by Refugees International makes that scrutiny especially urgent. Aligning with outside powers cannot replace a legitimate mandate from the public. Tigray’s recovery requires leadership accountable to its communities, including displaced people, women, survivors, and former combatants—not merely competing political factions.
The African Union’s responsibility
The AU-led mediation panel, headed by Olusegun Obasanjo alongside Uhuru Kenyatta and Phumzile Mlambo-Ngcuka, helped secure the agreement. The AU also received a central role in monitoring compliance. That achievement carried a continuing responsibility to make implementation credible.
The sources reviewed here do not establish that Obasanjo deliberately sided with Abiy Ahmed. Personal accusations should therefore be distinguished from an institutional critique: the AU must explain why its mediation and monitoring arrangements did not secure lasting civilian protection.
When a peace process restores state authority while displaced families remain without a safe route home, its impartiality will reasonably be questioned. The answer must be transparent reporting, independent verification, and visible pressure on violators. Diplomatic restraint becomes inadequate when it leaves victims unable to see whether their complaints produce consequences.
Western partnership and selective urgency
Western governments should also face scrutiny, but their policies should be assessed individually. It would be inaccurate to portray every Western response as unconditional support for Addis Ababa. The EU, for example, expressed concern in September 2026 about Ethiopian federal drone strikes and condemned strikes affecting humanitarian convoys.
Nevertheless, diplomatic criticism can coexist with partnerships that weaken accountability. Le Monde reported in May 2026 on President Emmanuel Macron’s close relationship with Abiy Ahmed and substantial French economic support, despite serious concerns surrounding the Tigray war. This raises a legitimate question: have influential partners rewarded normalization faster than they have demanded demonstrable protection and justice?
Humanitarian assistance should continue. People facing hunger must never become instruments of diplomatic pressure. But political endorsement and discretionary government support should be accompanied by public benchmarks for civilian protection, humanitarian access, accountability, and safe voluntary return.
Displaced people expose the failure most clearly
In its late-September 2026 statement, Refugees International reported that more than 800,000 people displaced from Western Tigray still could not return home. A survey conducted by its local partners found moderate or severe food insecurity in more than 95 percent of the displaced households surveyed, with roughly a quarter of children suffering acute malnutrition. These are findings from the surveyed population, not a census of all displaced Tigrayans, but they reveal an urgent crisis.
For these families, peace has not delivered the most basic things: a secure home, enough food, and confidence in tomorrow. Their suffering must become the central measure of implementation.
Pretoria’s failure should not become an argument for endless war. It should become an argument for a stronger peace: independently verified obligations, meaningful consequences for violations, survivor-centered justice, and displaced communities represented in decisions about their future.
The Ethiopian government must fulfill its obligations. Tigrayan leaders must answer their people. The AU must demonstrate impartiality through action. International partners must measure progress through civilian safety rather than diplomatic convenience. A peace agreement fulfills its purpose only when the people it claims to protect can finally live in peace.